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[ICML 2022 / ICLR 2024] Source code for our papers "Plug & Play Attacks: Towards Robust and Flexible Model Inversion Attacks" and "Be Careful What You Smooth For".

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LukasStruppek/Plug-and-Play-Attacks

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Plug & Play Attacks: Towards Robust and Flexible Model Inversion Attacks (ICML 2022)

PPA Examples

Abstract: Model inversion attacks (MIAs) aim to create synthetic images that reflect the class-wise characteristics from a target classifier's private training data by exploiting the model's learned knowledge. Previous research has developed generative MIAs that use generative adversarial networks (GANs) as image priors tailored to a specific target model. This makes the attacks time- and resource-consuming, inflexible, and susceptible to distributional shifts between datasets. To overcome these drawbacks, we present Plug & Play Attacks, which relax the dependency between the target model and image prior, and enable the use of a single GAN to attack a wide range of targets, requiring only minor adjustments to the attack. Moreover, we show that powerful MIAs are possible even with publicly available pre-trained GANs and under strong distributional shifts, for which previous approaches fail to produce meaningful results. Our extensive evaluation confirms the improved robustness and flexibility of Plug & Play Attacks and their ability to create high-quality images revealing sensitive class characteristics.
Full Paper (PDF)

Be Careful What You Smooth For: Label Smoothing Can Be a Privacy Shield but Also a Catalyst for Model Inversion Attacks (ICLR 2024)

PPA Examples

Abstract: Label smoothing – using softened labels instead of hard ones – is a widely adopted regularization method for deep learning, showing diverse benefits such as enhanced generalization and calibration. Its implications for preserving model privacy, however, have remained unexplored. To fill this gap, we investigate the impact of label smoothing on model inversion attacks (MIAs), which aim to generate class-representative samples by exploiting the knowledge encoded in a classifier, thereby inferring sensitive information about its training data. Through extensive analyses, we uncover that traditional label smoothing fosters MIAs, thereby increasing a model's privacy leakage. Even more, we reveal that smoothing with negative factors counters this trend, impeding the extraction of class-related information and leading to privacy preservation, beating state-of-the-art defenses. This establishes a practical and powerful novel way for enhancing model resilience against MIAs.
Full Paper (PDF)

Model Inversion Attacks

Attack Pipeline

Model inversion attacks (MIAs) intend to create synthetic images that reflect the characteristics of a specific class from a model's training data. For face recognition, the target model is trained to classify the identities of a set of people. An adversary without specific knowledge about the identities but with access to the trained model then tries to create synthetic facial images that share characteristic features with the targeted identities, such as gender, eye color, and facial shape. More intuitively, the adversary can be interpreted as a phantom sketch artist who aims to reconstruct faces based on the knowledge extracted from a target model.

Changelog

  • January 18, 2024 Updated repository to add the code of ICLR paper "Be Careful What You Smooth For". The update includes support for label smoothing training, the knowledge extraction score, and various code improvements. We also added pre-trained weights of the ResNet-152 classifiers used in the paper.
  • October 12, 2023 Updated PyTorch version to 2.0 to improve speed and add support for additional features.
  • July 20, 2022 Added GPU memory requirements.
  • July 18, 2022 Updated BibTex with proceeding information.
  • June 22, 2022 We added a release containing the code and model weights used to perform the attacks and evaluation in our ICML paper. See the default_attacking_local.yaml file on how to use local weight files. To use your own models, you need to extend classifier.py and, if necessary, attack_config_parser.py accordingly.

Setup and Run Attacks

GPU Memory Requirements

To provide a reference point for the GPU memory needed to perform the attacks, we measured the memory consumption for attacks against a ResNet-18 model trained on images with size 224x224. The memory consumption mainly depends on the batch size (BS), the target model size, and the StyleGAN2 model size. For our paper, we used V100-SXM3-32GB-H GPUs, but GPUs with smaller memory sizes are also sufficient.

StyleGAN2 Resolution ResNet-18 (BS 20) ResNet-18 (BS 10) ResNet-18 (BS 1)
1024x1024 24.1 GB 15.8 GB 3.2 GB
512x512 16.3 GB 10.8 GB 2.7 GB
256x256 7.7 GB 5.1 GB 2.1 GB

Setup Docker Container

The easiest way to perform the attacks is to run the code in a Docker container. To build the Docker image run the following script:

docker build -t plug_and_play_attacks  .

Our Dockerfile also allows storing a Weights & Biases API key directly in the image. For this, provide the API key as an argument when building the image:

docker build -t plug_and_play_attacks --build-arg wandb_key=xxxxxxxxxx .

To create and start a Docker container run the following command from the project's root:

docker run --rm --shm-size 16G --name ppa --gpus '"device=0"' -v $(pwd):/workspace -it plug_and_play_attacks bash

To add additional GPUs, modify the option '"device=0,1,2"' accordingly. Detach from the container using Ctrl+P followed by Ctrl+Q.

Setup StyleGAN2

For using our attacks with StyleGAN2, clone the official StyleGAN2-ADA-Pytorch repo into the project's root folder and remove its git specific folders and files.

git clone https://github.com/NVlabs/stylegan2-ada-pytorch.git
rm -r --force stylegan2-ada-pytorch/.git/
rm -r --force stylegan2-ada-pytorch/.github/
rm --force stylegan2-ada-pytorch/.gitignore

To download the pre-trained weights, run the following command from the project's root folder or copy the weights into stylegan2-ada-pytorch:

wget https://nvlabs-fi-cdn.nvidia.com/stylegan2-ada-pytorch/pretrained/ffhq.pkl -P stylegan2-ada-pytorch/

NVIDIA provides the following pre-trained models: ffhq.pkl, metfaces.pkl, afhqcat.pkl, afhqdog.pkl, afhqwild.pkl, cifar10.pkl, brecahad.pkl. Adjust the command above accordingly. For the training and resolution details, please visit the official repo.

Setup Weights & Biases

We rely on Weights & Biases for experiment tracking and result storage. A free account is needed at wandb.ai to track the experiments. Note that we do not have any commercial relationship with Weights & Biases.

To connect your account to Weights & Biases, run the following command and add your API key:

wandb init

You can find the key at wandb.ai/settings. After the key was added, stop the script with Ctrl+C.

Our Dockerfile also allows storing the API key directly in the image. For this, provide the key as an argument when building the image:

docker build -t plug_and_play_attacks --build-arg wandb_key=xxxxxxxxxx .

Prepare Datasets

We support FaceScrub, CelebA and Stanford Dogs as datasets to train the target models. Please follow the instructions on the websites to download the datasets. Place all datasets in the folder data and make sure that the following structure is kept:

.
├── data       
    ├── celeba
        ├── img_align_celeba
        ├── identity_CelebA.txt
        ├── list_attr_celeba.txt
        ├── list_bbox_celeba.txt
        ├── list_eval_partition.txt
        ├── list_landmarks_align_celeba.txt
        └── list_landmarks_celeba.txt
    ├── facescrub
        ├── actors
            ├── faces
            └── images
        └── actresses
            ├── faces
            └── images
    ├── stanford_dogs
        ├── Annotation
        ├── Images
        ├── file_list.mat
        ├── test_data.mat
        ├── test_list.mat
        ├── train_data.mat
        └── train_list.mat

For CelebA, we used a custom crop of the images using the HD CelebA Cropper to increase the resolution of the cropped and aligned samples. We cropped the images using a face factor of 0.65 and resized them to size 224x224 with bicubic interpolation. The other parameters were left at default. Note that we only use the 1,000 identities with the most number of samples out of 10,177 available identities.

Train Target Models

Our code currently allows training all ResNet, ResNeSt, DenseNet, and Inception-v3 models stated at pytorch.org/vision/stable/models. To add support for other models, you need to modify the method _build_model in models/classifier.py, add the new model, and adjust its output layer's size.

To define the model and training configuration, you need to create a configuration file. We provide a example configuration with explanations at configs/training/default_training.yaml. To train the target models accordingly to our paper, we provide a training configuration for each dataset. You only need to adjust the architecture used and the Weights & Biases configuration - all other parameters are identical for each target dataset. Only the batch size has to be adjusted for larger models.

After a training configuration file has been created, run the following command to start the training with the specified configuration:

python train_model.py -c=configs/training/default_training.yaml

After the optimization is performed, the results are automatically evaluated. All results together with the initial, optimized, and selected latent vectors are stored at WandB.

Note for training with label smoothing: To train models with label smoothing regularization, simply adjust the label_smoothing parameter in the training config. If no parameter is specified, the smoothing factor is set to 0.0. For training with a negative smoothing factor, a scheduler is used by default to stabilize the training process. To use a custom scheduler, simply adjust the ls_scheduler function in train_model.py.

Perform Attacks

To perform our attacks, prepare an attack configuration file including the WandB run paths of the target and evaluation models. We provide an example configuration with explanations at configs/attacking/default_attacking.yaml. We further provide configuration files to reproduce the various attack results stated in our paper. You only need to adjust the run paths for each dataset combination, and possibly the batch size.

After an attack configuration file has been created, run the following command to start the attack with the specified configuration:

python attack.py -c=configs/attacking/default_attacking.yaml

We also provide pre-trained model weights for the target and evaluation models with our GitHub Releases. Download the weight files to a local folder and adjust the model parameters accordingly, as demonstrated in configs/attacking/default_attacking_local.yaml.

All results including the metrics will be stored at WandB for easy tracking and comparison.

Compute Knowledge Extraction Score

We decided to exclude the knowledge extraction score from being automatically computed after the attack is finished due to the high additional computation time. Instead, training the student model to compute the score has to be manually started by running knowledge_extraction_score.py using the WandB run path of the finished attack.

python knowledge_extraction_score.py -r=username/model_inversion_attacks/xxxxxxxx -d=FaceScrub

The computed knowledge extraction scores are automatically stored in the WandB run summary.

Citation

If you build upon our work, please don't forget to cite us.

@inproceedings{struppek2022ppa,
    title={Plug \& Play Attacks: Towards Robust and Flexible Model Inversion Attacks},
    author={Lukas Struppek and Dominik Hintersdorf and Antonio De Almeida Correia and Antonia Adler and Kristian Kersting},
    booktitle = {Proceedings of the 39th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)},
    pages = {20522--20545},
    series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research},
    publisher = {PMLR},
    year={2022}
}

@inproceedings{struppek24smoothing,
  author = {Lukas Struppek and Dominik Hintersdorf and Kristian Kersting},
  title = {Be Careful What You Smooth For: Label Smoothing Can Be a Privacy Shield but Also a Catalyst for Model Inversion Attacks},
  booktitle = {The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR)},
  year = {2024},
}

Implementation Credits

Some of our implementations rely on other repos. We want to thank the authors for making their code publicly available. For license details, refer to the corresponding files in our repo. For more details on the specific functionality, please visit the corresponding repos.